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I. INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical companies leverage the inelastic demand1 of the
pharmaceutical drug market by offering remedies, treatments, and
cures to sick people to generate substantial profits.2 However, rare
diseases continue to frustrate scientists trying to find cures.3 Fre-
quently, prohibitive costs or confounding biological and technological
barriers thwart the would-be development of remedies for serious dis-
eases.4 In 1983, a bipartisan U.S. Congress sought to take on the finan-
cial barriers that stall the development of drugs for diseases without
any cost-effective pathway to development.5 Recognizing that rare
diseases frequently lack a sufficiently profitable market to motivate
pharmaceutical companies to develop and research remedies, Con-
gress enacted the Orphan Drug Act (“ODA” or the “Statute”).6 The
ODA emerged with a variety of financial incentives for pharmaceuti-
cal companies, including tax breaks, periods of marketing exclusivity,
and a fast-track approval process for the development of drugs
targeted at orphan diseases.7 Orphan diseases are those that affect
fewer than 200,000 people in the United States or diseases for which
the likelihood of recuperating development costs to make the drug
profitable is small.8
1. See, e.g., Marin Gemmill, The Price Inelasticity of Pharmaceutical Drugs: An
Exploration of Demand in Different Settings, 49 (January 2008) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science), https://
etheses.lse.ac.uk/2944/1/U615895.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EEG-DT3K] (“[G]iven that
the demand for brand-name drugs should be very inelastic when there are few thera-
peutic and no molecular substitutes and much higher when there are generic drugs
available.”).
2. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223 [https://perma.cc/
8H6S-PPWD].
3. Greg Breining, Rare Diseases Difficult to Diagnose, Cures Hard to Come by,








8. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012) (defining a “rare disease or condition” as
one “affect[ing] less than 200,000 persons in the United States”); see also Scott Got-
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Since the early 1980s, pharmaceutical companies have leveraged the
benefits of the ODA to successfully develop more than 600 orphan
drugs.9 The ODA survived thirty-five years without major amend-
ment, evidencing its general efficacy and success.10 In 2016 alone, the
Office of Orphan Products Development (“OOPD”) received 568
new requests for designation—more than double the number of re-
quests received in 2012.11 This dramatic increase in petitions illustrates
the ODA’s continued success.12 In response to the increasing requests
for designation, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) recently
issued guidance on how it will address the “backlog of existing desig-
nation requests.”13 This recent guidance seeks to improve the effi-
ciency of the ODA and streamline the approval process for new
orphan drug designations.14
Though the ODA has successfully stimulated the development of
orphan drugs, other consequences of the ODA currently dominate the
conversation about the Statute.15 Recent trends showing dramatic in-
creases in ODA petitions and approvals cause commentators to ques-
tion whether pharmaceutical companies abuse the ODA.16 Critics
allege that ambiguous language within the Statute provides pharma-
tlieb, FDA Is Advancing the Goals of the Orphan Drug Act, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FDAVoices/
ucm612012.htm [https://perma.cc/497D-EYGB] (“[A] rare disease [is] defined as a
disease [that] generally affects fewer than 200,000 people in the United States . . . .”).
9. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA’S ORPHAN DRUG MODERNIZATION
PLAN 2 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsfor
RareDiseasesConditions/HowtoapplyforOrphanProductDesignation/UCM565068.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5NW-7EAW]; see also Sarah Jane Tribble, Sen. Grassley Launches




10. See generally Kurt R. Karst, Fitting New Scientific Advances Into an Old Regu-
latory Paradigm: Fusion Proteins and Orphan Drug “Sameness”, FDA L. BLOG (July
25, 2017), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2017/07/fitting-
new-scientific-advances-into-an-old-regulatory-paradigm-fusion-proteins-and-orphan-
drug-same.html [https://perma.cc/8JHG-D4NF] (noting that “there are other, less visi-
ble measures of the success of the ODA, such as FDA’s ability to keep up with and
address scientific advances in an aging regulatory paradigm”).




15. See generally Shannon Gibson & Barbara von Tigerstrom, Orphan Drug In-
centives in the Pharmacogenomic Context: Policy Responses in the US and Canada, 2
J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 236 (2015) (discussing how new genomic technologies changes
the definition of an orphan-drug subset); Lydia Raw, Note, Are We Adopting the Or-
phans, or Creating Them? Medical Ethics and Legal Jurisprudential Guidance for Pro-
posed Changes to the Orphan Drug Act, 9 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 295, 296 (2017).
16. See Karst, supra note 10 (“The success of the ODA is most apparent from the
increasing number of orphan drug approvals and orphan drug designations each
year[;] . . . [i]n fact, there are so many orphan drug designation requests these days
that the FDA had to create an Orphan Drug Modernization Plan. . . .”).
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ceutical giants with latitude to misuse the incentives of the ODA for
profit.17 Many critics raise concerns that prohibitively expensive or-
phan drug prices are partially attributable to the way Congress drafted
the ODA.18 Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown commented in December
2015 that the ODA has never been purposed to “pad the profit mar-
gins of big pharma.”19 Senator Brown was concerned that loopholes in
the Statute enable pharmaceutical companies to abuse the market ex-
clusivity and tax-benefit provisions of the ODA.20 Other critics regard
the ODA as a waste of resources that diverts funds from more com-
mon diseases’ cost-effective treatments to “ultra-orphan” disease
treatment.21
National Public Radio’s Kaiser Health News (“KHN”) published a
series of reports that echo these criticisms and highlight the extent to
which the ODA drives up drug prices.22 Some critics voicing skepti-
cism that the ODA achieves its aims are original sponsors of the Stat-
ute.23 Moreover, the inaccessibility of the medication due to the
exorbitant pricing of the drugs concerns congressional leaders.24
Other commentators similarly allege that the ODA contributes to the
high price of orphan drugs, straining the ability of insurance compa-
nies to make the drugs available on the market.25
Affording drugs proves impossible for some patients suffering from
orphan diseases.26 In 2016, a thirty-day treatment of at least ten differ-
ent orphan drugs would cost a patient more than $40,000.27 Crystiva,
for example, is an orphan drug that treats X-linked hy-
pophosphatemia and costs $160,000 per year for kids and $200,000 for
17. See John T. Aquino, Do Biopharmas Abuse the Orphan Drug Act? Debate
Resurfaces, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.bna.com/biopharmas-abuse-or-
phan-n57982083049/ [https://perma.cc/ZU8M-VGDA] (suggesting that KHN’s criti-
cisms aren’t entirely new and that commentators have noticed approval of drugs that
were never intended to support orphan populations).
18. See Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, High Prices for Orphan Drugs Strain
Families and Insurers, NPR (Jan. 17, 2017, 1:36 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2017/01/17/509507035/high-prices-for-orphan-drugs-strain-families-and-
insurers [https://perma.cc/42GJ-N9QF] (quoting U.S. Rep. Henry Wasman, D-Calif.
as saying “[w]hat was intended for a good purpose can be used for a purpose that’s
harmful to patients who can’t afford drugs”).
19. See Dina Gusovsky, How a Blockbuster Drug Can Become a Subsidized ‘Or-
phan’, NBR (Dec. 2, 2015), http://nbr.com/2015/12/02/how-a-blockbuster-drug-can-be
come-a-subsidized-orphan/ [https://perma.cc/2QFS-3EVM].
20. See id.
21. Jonathan Wilcox, Orrin Hatch, It’s Time to Defend the Orphan Drug Act, HILL
(May 29, 2017, 10:00 AM EDT), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/
335372-orrin-hatch-its-time-to-defend-the-orphan-drug-act [https://perma.cc/Z3Q4-
MDEL].
22. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18. See generally Raw, supra note 15, at 307.
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adults.28 In other cases, drugs may cost patients suffering from orphan
diseases $28,000 for a thirty-day supply, or more than $336,000 annu-
ally.29 While the astronomical orphan drug prices financially immobi-
lize patients, these drug prices yield handsome revenues for
pharmaceutical companies.30 Though the high price of orphan drugs
does not directly offend the Statute,31 critics fear that the lucrative
periods of exclusivity that breathe life into orphan remedies might
perpetuate the extreme cost of these treatments.32
This Comment examines the extent to which Congress empowered
the FDA to address the increase in petitions and the general accessi-
bility of orphan drug remedies. Specifically, this Comment seeks to
understand why the FDA’s interpretation of the purpose33 of the
ODA seems to conflict with the statutory intent34 as interpreted by
federal courts.35 This Comment considers a statute’s ultimate goal or
social purpose to be the purpose of the statute, whereas the express
mechanisms by which Congress seeks to bring about these goals is
best understood as the statute’s intent.36 To understand the FDA and
judiciary’s differing interpretations of the ODA, this Comment ana-
lyzes the language of the Statute, recent ODA litigation, FDA’s
promulgated regulations, as well as recent response to pharmaceutical
companies’ increase in designation requests for orphan drugs.37
Ultimately, this Comment strives to determine whether or not the
ODA can effectively achieve the goals Congress set forth in 1983.38
This Comment conducts a statutory analysis of the ODA and closely
examines how courts, the FDA, and litigant pharmaceutical compa-
28. See Mark Terry, Debate Over the Orphan Drug Act Heats Up, BIOSPACE (Aug.
30, 2018), https://www.biospace.com/article/-ppl4-debate-over-the-orphan-drug-act-
heats-up/ [https://perma.cc/Y6XT-UQDG].
29. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18.
30. See id. See also Gusovsky, supra note 19 (“Drugs approved by the Food and
Drug Administration as ‘orphan drugs’ have seen sales increase from $46.6 billion in
2014 to $54 billion this year in the U.S. alone and are projected by drug industry
consultant EvaluatePharma to reach above $60 billion in 2016. Worldwide, orphan
drug sales are forecast to total $102 billion this year and $178 billion by 2020.”).
31. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(5)–(6), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983).
32. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18 (“[O]rphan drugs like Cerezyme often
have very few competing drugs that could help them drive down the cost . . . . ‘[T]he
pharmaceutical company can set the price and [the pharmacies] have to be a price
acceptor.’”).
33. When italicized as purpose, the Comment refers to the “ultimate goal” of the
ODA: treating victims of orphan diseases. See infra Part III.A.
34. When italicized as intent, the Comment refers to Congress’s express authoriza-
tion to create lucrative financial incentives for drugs that have earned orphan drug
designation. See infra Part III.B.
35. See infra Part III.B.
36. See infra Part III.B.
37. See infra Parts IV–V.
38. See infra Part III.
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nies interpret the Statute differently.39 This Comment argues that
Congress’s intent in passing the ODA was to create lucrative incen-
tives for the development of drugs for orphan diseases.40 But, Con-
gress’s purpose in drafting the ODA was to ensure the drugs became
available to patients.41 The incentives serve as a tool to achieve the
purpose of the ODA: to treat patients suffering from rare diseases.42
This Comment concludes that to better effectuate this purpose, Con-
gress must amend the ODA or pass other legislation empowering the
FDA to promulgate regulations that alter the schedule and adminis-
tration of the ODA’s lucrative “basket of goodies.”43
Part I analyzes the history of the ODA and discusses how the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and Chevron v. NRDC relate to
ODA litigation.44 Part II analyzes Depomed v. HHS, an important re-
cent case involving the ODA, to illustrate the conflict between the
legislative intent and the social purpose of the ODA.45 This Section
focuses on distinguishing between the purpose of the Statute as articu-
lated in the FDA’s guidance and the ODA itself, with the intent of the
ODA as revealed through litigation in federal courts.46 Part IV exam-
ines whether the FDA’s recently promulgated regulations will aid in
effectuating the ODA’s goals and survive scrutiny in court.47 Part V
proposes a series of amendments to the ODA to reconcile the differ-
ences between its intent and purpose.48 Additionally, Part V argues
that “salami-slicing,” the re-marketing of existing drugs for ODA pur-
poses, does not violate the intent of the ODA, but it thwarts the pur-
pose of the ODA.49 The Comment concludes with a prediction of what
future litigation will yield if Congress does not amend the ODA.50
II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Design of the ODA
In drafting the ODA, the authors specifically contemplated diseases
like amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”) and Tourette’s syndrome.51
Because of the small population of Americans affected by diseases
39. See infra Part III.
40. See infra Part III.B.
41. See infra Part III.A.
42. See infra Part III.
43. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18 (“In a 2009 webinar, an FDA official
referred to the incentive package as ‘our basket of goodies.’”).
44. See infra Part II.
45. See infra Part III.
46. See infra Part III.
47. See infra Part IV.
48. See infra Part V.
49. See infra Part V.A.
50. See infra Part VI.
51. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97–414, § 1(b)(1), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983). See also Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18 (“Meyers[,] . . . an angry
mother who wouldn’t put up with pharmaceutical companies ignoring her son’s ill-
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL304.txt unknown Seq: 7  6-MAY-19 13:26
2019] BILLION DOLLAR ORPHANS 737
like ALS and Tourette’s syndrome, pharmaceutical companies main-
tained a low likelihood of recuperating the costs of developing drugs
for such diseases.52 To address the lack of motivation for pharmaceuti-
cal companies or “sponsors” to invest in developing orphan drugs,
Congress sought to provide financial incentives to spur their develop-
ment.53 The Statute calls these diseases “rare diseases or condi-
tions.”54 Accordingly, a rare disease or condition refers to any disease
for which a company has no reasonable expectation of recovering its
costs of development from sales.55
As intended, the ODA reduces the financial barrier preventing or-
phan drugs from making it to market.56 Presumably, if a sufficiently
profitable market could sustain a sponsor’s drug, it would never re-
quire or receive the orphan drug benefits.57 As the Statute notes, the
FDA will designate a drug as an orphan drug after “the Secretary
finds that [the] drug for which [the] request is submitted . . . is being or
will be investigated for a rare disease or condition and . . . an applica-
tion for such drug is approved.”58 Congress expressly delegated this
determination to the FDA to ensure that the ODA incentives are used
to effectuate the Statute’s goals.59
To protect the sponsor’s development of an orphan drug, the ODA
guarantees a seven-year period of exclusivity if the statutory obliga-
tions are met.60 This period of exclusivity is subject to two excep-
tions.61 First, the FDA may approve another drug for the same disease
and condition as the first if the “holder of the approved application or
of the license cannot assure the availability of sufficient quantities of
the drug to meet the needs of persons with the disease or condition for
which the drug was designated.”62 Second, if the holder provides writ-
ten consent for the “approval of other applications or the issuance of
other licenses before the expiration of [the] seven-year period,” the
FDA may violate the original sponsor’s exclusivity period and grant a
new drug status as an orphan drug.63 These statutory exceptions sug-
ness, Tourette syndrome . . . mobilized advocates, lawmakers[,] and even TV actor
Jack Klugman . . . to persuade Congress to pass the Orphan Drug Act.”).
52. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983 § 1(b)(1).
53. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa, 360ee (2012).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb (2012).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2)(A) (defining a “rare disease or condition” as one “af-
fect[ing] less than 200,000 persons in the United States”).
56. Orphan Drug Act of 1983 § 1(b)(5).
57. See id. § 1(b)(3).
58. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb.
59. Id.
60. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(1)(A)–(B) (outlining that the drug must be desig-
nated to treat or investigate an orphan disease and its application be approved under
21 U.S.C. § 355 or 42 USC § 262 and noting that once it has been, the “Secretary shall
designate the drug as a drug for such disease or condition”).
61. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b) (2012).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b)(1).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b)(2).
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gest that Congress prioritizes making viable drugs available in the
market above determining which sponsor gets to bring that drug to
market.64
The ODA does not secure market exclusivity by patents, though it
works similarly in effect.65 Periods of exclusivity are more valuable
benefits than patents, however, because they are self-effectuating.66
That is, when administered correctly, periods of exclusivity are distin-
guishable from patents in that a sponsor should not need to litigate for
them to become effective.67 Thus, when a sponsor qualifies for seven
years of marketing exclusivity, they receive a substantial financial ben-
efit, potentially foreclosing other companies’ ability to market generic
drugs for the same disease.68 The Statute also extends tax credits for
companies to test expenses of orphan drugs69 and credit for qualified
clinical testing expenses.70 Sponsors also benefit from “defraying the
costs of qualified testing expenses incurred in connection with the de-
velopment”71 of orphan drugs. Taken together, these statutory protec-
tions of the development and distribution of orphan drugs provide
strong incentives for pharmaceutical companies to market orphan
drugs.72
B. Judicial Doctrines
1. The Administrative Procedure Act
Congress grants administrative agencies authority to engage in ex-
pressly delegated quasi-legislative functions.73 The APA outlines the
process that holds administrative agencies accountable for the regula-
tions Congress authorizes them to promulgate.74 Congress authorizes
agencies like the FDA, the Department of Justice, and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to engage in rulemaking to effectuate a
64. Id.
65. See Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 53, 60 (“Although marketing rights are focused on selling in the market, they
are somewhat stronger than ordinary patent rights. First, patent rights are not self-
executing. No district attorney, no federal agency will step forward to champion a
patent holder’s rights. If a patent holder wishes to exercise its right to exclude some-
one from selling the product, the patent holder must bring a lawsuit. In contrast, when
a company receives marketing rights, the FDA enforces those rights by refusing to
grant approval to any other company.”).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 60–61.
69. See I.R.C. § 45C (2012) (“Clinical testing expenses for certain drugs for rare
diseases or conditions.”).
70. I.R.C. § 45C(c).
71. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(a) (2012).
72. See I.R.C. § 45C (“Clinical testing expenses for certain drugs for rare diseases
or conditions”).
73. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
74. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
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given statute.75 Section 706 of the APA grants judicial oversight to
agency actions to protect the public from agencies that stray from
Congress’s goals in passing a law.76 Specifically, any agency action,
determination, or promulgated rule is subject to judicial review under
section 706.77 Thus, if pharmaceutical companies object to the FDA’s
actions related to the ODA, they may bring challenges under the
APA. As such, companies may claim that the FDA violates the APA
by improperly interpreting the meaning of specific language in the
ODA.78 However, it is settled law that “a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.”79 In reviewing these APA claims,
federal courts engage in what is known as a Chevron analysis.
2. Chevron Analysis
In Chevron v. NRDC, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a two-part
test to evaluate whether to defer to a government agency’s interpreta-
tion of a statute that the agency administers.80 In Chevron, the Court
recognized that the judicial branch should not evaluate the wisdom or
merits of congressional action, including authority delegated to agen-
cies.81 The Court held that “[only] if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, [will the court ask] whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.”82 In the face of a challenge to administrative action, the Court
held that the role of the judiciary is to determine whether or not Con-
gress created a space where the agency needed to “elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation.”83
Under the first step of Chevron, courts use basic tools of statutory
construction to review whether Congress addressed the issue in ques-
tion.84 Courts will give effect to the plain language of a statue when it
is unambiguous and are reluctant to construe ambiguities in a way that
offends congressional intent.85 When no ambiguity is found, the re-
viewing court and the agency must give effect to the unambiguously
75. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
77. Id. (“[H]old unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”).
78. See, e.g., Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp.
3d 217 (D.D.C. 2014).
79. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 463 U.S.
29, 42–43 (1983).
80. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984); see also David
J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV.
201.
81. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
82. Id. at 843.
83. Id. at 843–44.
84. See id. at 842–43.
85. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 54 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that “[t]he plain
language of the statute is the most reliable” indicator of congressional intent).
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expressed intent of Congress.86 Moreover, because “[j]udges are not
experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of gov-
ernment,”87 courts will only engage in the second level of a Chevron
analysis (“Chevron II”) when an ambiguity requires such analysis.88
Under the second step of Chevron, courts determine “whether the
agency’s action is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.”89 Often, so long as the agency’s interpretation represents a “rea-
sonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to
the agency’s care by the statute,” the court will afford the agency what
is known as Chevron deference.90 Agencies entitled to Chevron defer-
ence can exercise discretion in the space of congressional silence or
ambiguity unless a court finds their interpretations unreasonable.91
This Comment considers several instances involving ODA litigation
and corresponding Chevron analysis.92
III. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE ODA CONFLICTS
WITH ITS PURPOSE
Interpreting the legislative intent of a statute often proves a com-
plex task.93 Scholars, judges, and agencies can choose from a variety
of approaches to interpret a statute’s meaning.94 Some approaches
seek to unpack a bill’s legislative history to arrive at the meaning of
the statutory text.95 Other approaches consider Congress’s general in-
tent or what the political context suggests about the statute’s pur-
pose.96 In contrast, some textualist and plain meaning approaches
refuse to consider anything but the simplest sources of guidance—like
dictionaries.97 The Supreme Court’s Chevron framework safeguards
judges from complex statutory analysis when the statute’s language is
unambiguous on its face.98 Moreover, if a Chevron II analysis is re-
86. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
87. Id. at 865.
88. Id. at 842–43.
89. Id. at 843.
90. Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Burwell, No. GJH-15-852, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68230,
at *35 (D. Md. May 27, 2015).
91. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; see generally Barron & Kagan, supra note 80.
92. See infra Part III.A.
93. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATU-
TORY INTERPRETATION, 214 (1st ed. 2000) (“The trouble starts when you try to deter-
mine what is meant by legislative intent . . . .”).
94. See id. at 211–12, 223.
95. Id. at 211.
96. Id. at 221 (“Purposivism attempts to achieve the democratic legitimacy of
other intentionalist theories in a way that renders statutory interpretation adaptable
to new circumstances. Purposivism sets the originalist inquiry at a higher level of gen-
erality. It asks, ‘What was the statute’s goal?’ rather than ‘What did the drafters spe-
cifically intend?’”).
97. Id. at 228.
98. See Chevron, 467 US. at 842–43 (“When a court reviews an agency’s construc-
tion of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
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quired, agencies receive extensive deference when reasonably inter-
preting their own regulations, so long as the interpretation is not
wholly inconsistent with the statute.99
Interpretation of a statute’s meaning is important because it can re-
veal a discrepancy between a statute’s legislative intent and social pur-
pose.100 As discussed above, this Comment considers a statute’s
ultimate goal or social purpose to be the purpose of the statute,
whereas the express mechanisms by which Congress seeks to bring
these goals about is best understood as the intent.101 A variety of stat-
utory interpretation methods demonstrate differences between intent
and purpose.102 Textualist methods of statutory analysis provide the
most predictable and straightforward ways to examine the meaning of
statutes.103 However, these methods of analysis can neglect the ulti-
mate goals of the legislation.104 Often, analysis of a statute’s text alone
will only reveal the literal intent evident in the language of the statute,
neglecting to consider the legislation’s broader aims, or purpose.105
Other approaches, known as intentionalist frameworks, consider
contextual factors and evidence outside the four corners of the law.106
Purposivism, for example, seeks to determine if there is a difference
between a statute’s apparent goal and what the drafters intended.107
The purposivism approach to statutory analysis relies less on a strict
construction of the statute’s text and credits the relative context at the
enactment of the legislation.108 This approach affords the statute’s
reader latitude in addressing new or unforeseen circumstances.109 Es-
pecially in situations where a statute’s intent may not accord with its
purpose, the purposivism approach makes analyzing a statute’s effec-
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”).
99. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (noting
that, in construing administrative regulations, “the ultimate criterion is the adminis-
trative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly errone-
ous or inconsistent with the regulation.”); see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (noting that “an agency’s construction of its own regulations
is entitled to ‘substantial deference’”).
100. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 93, at 221.
101. See infra Part III.
102. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 93, at 211–12, 223.
103. Id. at 223.
104. Id.; see also Bradley Silverman, Statutory Ambiguity in King v. Burwell: Time
for a Categorical Chevron Rule, 125 YALE L.J. F. 44, 53 (2015) (suggesting that at
times where a statute’s text and legislative history are equally clear and still in con-
flict, a categorical “agency wins” rule advances “Chevron’s purpose of empowering
agencies with broad policymaking latitude”).
105. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 93, at 223.
106. Id. at 214.
107. Id. at 221.
108. See id.
109. Id.
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tiveness more feasible.110 In addition, this approach provides greater
emphasis on what this Comment refers to as the statute’s purpose,
whereas the textualist methods of statutory analysis tend to only re-
veal a statute’s literal intent.111 However, the argument that the statu-
tory purpose better captures a drafter’s goals relies on an essential
foundation: that the goal of the statute is discernable from the con-
gressional record.112 In this case, the purpose of the ODA is largely
uncontroversial.113
A. The Purpose of the ODA is to Treat Patients Suffering
from Rare Diseases
The distinction between the intent and purpose of the ODA explains
much of the recent controversy surrounding the Statute. As designed,
the ODA operates by creating lucrative incentives to spur develop-
ment of remedies for orphan diseases and to provide therapies or
cures to patients suffering from rare diseases.114 The intent of the Stat-
ute is to provide these financial incentives to pharmaceutical compa-
nies and inspire them to take on otherwise unprofitable drug
development.115 The development of these orphan drugs ultimately
achieves the purpose of the ODA: providing treatments for patients
suffering from orphan diseases.116 The congressional record and the
language of the Statute confirm this ultimate goal, or purpose.117
The FDA understands the ODA’s ultimate purpose well.118 In June
2017, the FDA released the Orphan Drug Modernization Plan (“Mod-
ernization Plan” or the “Plan”).119 The Plan seeks to assure the public
that the FDA is aware of the recent backlog in orphan drug petitions
and will actively “enable continued progress toward more treatments
110. See id. at 221–22.
111. See id. at 223.
112. See id. at 221.
113. See infra Part III.A; see also Matthew Herder, What Is the Purpose of the Or-
phan Drug Act?, PLOS MED. (Jan 3, 2017), http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/arti-
cle/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002191&type=printable [https://perma.cc/3ZSF-
VZAH] (arguing that the “purpose” of the ODA is what this Comment refers to as
the intent, the “[redistribution] of resources to medical needs that would otherwise be
marginalized by market forces”).
114. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(a) (2012).
115. Id.
116. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b) 96 Stat. 2049, 2049
(1983).
117. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(a).
118. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 9; see also Orphan Drug Regula-
tions, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,117, 35,122 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 316) (noting that the
“FDA continues to believe that the current framework is the best means for giving
effect to the intent of the Orphan Drug Act, [and] to provide incentives for sponsors
to develop promising drugs for rare diseases and conditions that would not otherwise
be developed and approved”).
119. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 9.
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and even potential cures for rare diseases.”120 Throughout the Plan,
the FDA clearly articulates that the Statute’s goal is to “[pursue] treat-
ments for rare diseases,” and to continue “progress for the millions of
patients who are affected by one of these disorders.”121 Thus, the
FDA accepts that the purpose of the ODA focuses on providing treat-
ment to patients who suffer from rare diseases.
It is unpersuasive to suggest that the goal of the ODA is to provide
subsidies to financially enrich pharmaceutical companies.122 The lan-
guage and legislative history of the Statute support the accuracy of the
FDA’s interpretation of the ODA.123 The Statute explicitly refers to
the important public interest in reducing costs of developing drugs for
orphan diseases.124 Additionally, the House of Representatives ex-
pressly intended for ODA benefits to help orphan drug sponsors to
“recoup the cost of development by capturing all revenues from the
sale of the drug for the rare disease.”125
However, some critics of the ODA assert its purpose extends be-
yond the goal of treating rare diseases.126 These critics suggest that the
general motivation of the ODA is to “redistribute resources to medi-
cal needs that would otherwise be marginalized by market forces.”127
Such a purpose encompasses more than treating the most rare and
costly of diseases and their various sub-classifications.128 But this
broader interpretation of the ODA’s purpose is inconsistent with the
Statute.129 The name of the Statute and its opening remarks suggest a
narrower purpose of the law, which expressly addresses concerns fac-
ing the market for rare diseases.130 A broad interpretation that allo-
cates some resources to unmet medical needs—like diseases that
disproportionately affect the world’s poor—might be noble, but it is
inconsistent with the purpose of the ODA.131
Under purposivism, it is essential to clearly define the ODA’s objec-
tive from the outset to determine if the Statute is being effectuated as
designed.132 Though the ultimate purpose of the ODA is relatively un-
ambiguous, problems emerge when courts adjudicate claims arising
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18.
123. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Ivax Pharm., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929–30 n.1 (C.D.
Cal 2006) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-153, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 301, 303.).
124. Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(3)–(6), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983).
125. See Ivax Pharm., 459 F. Supp. 2d at 292–30 n.1 (citations omitted).
126. See Herder, supra note 113, at 2.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra Part III.
130. Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(1)-(3), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983).
131. See id.; Herder, supra note 113, at 2.
132. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 93, at 221.
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out of the language of the Statute. Applying the Chevron framework,
courts must initially undertake a literal and textualist interpretation of
the language of the Statute. As discussed, the Chevron framework
permits agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory language.133
However, when parts of a statute are unambiguous and rigidly con-
structed without consideration of the circumstances of the broader
context of the law, the statute’s true purpose will suffer at the hands of
the narrowly constructed intent.134 In the context of the ODA, in some
cases, the rigidly construed intent of the Statute makes it difficult for
the public to benefit from the Statute in accordance with the purpose
of the ODA.135
B. The Intent of the ODA is to Create Lucrative Financial
Incentives to Develop Remedies for Rare Diseases
and Conditions
Blind adherence to the explicit intent of the ODA makes it difficult
to achieve the ODA’s purpose. Courts tend to adopt textualist
frameworks and construe the language of statutes narrowly to arrive
at the most likely objectives of the law. Poorly written laws can create
challenges for judges trying to reconcile tension between a statute’s
intent and purpose.
1. Depomed Evidences Tension Between the the ODA’s
Intent and Purpose
The purpose of a statute is distinguishable from its intent in that the
purpose is the goal or the objective of the law while intent is nar-
rower.136 In Depomed, Inc. v. United States HHS, Depomed brought
suit alleging that the FDA abused its discretion in denying the drug
Gralise137 a seven-year period of market exclusivity after having “sat-
isfied [the only] two statutory requirements: (1) designation by the
[FDA] as a so-called ‘orphan drug’ . . . and (2) receipt of FDA ap-
proval to be marketed to the public.”138 In Depomed, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia addressed whether
the ODA required the FDA to extend a seven-year period of market-
ing exclusivity to Gralise, a designated orphan drug.139 The FDA de-
nied Gralise exclusivity because Neurontin and other generic, non-
133. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
134. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 93, at 221.
135. See generally infra Part III.
136. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 93, at 220.
137. Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d 217,
220 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that Gralise is used to treat a rare condition known as
postherpetic neuralgia (“PHN”)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 221.
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orphan designated drugs already existed in the market to treat pos-
therpetic neuralgia (“PHN”)––the disease that Gralise treats.140
Essentially, the FDA determined that because Gralise was the
“same drug” as Neurontin and other generic drugs already treating
PHN, the public would not benefit from the extension of the ODA’s
lucrative financial protections to Gralise.141 Therefore, to obtain FDA
approval classifying Gralise as an orphan drug, the FDA required De-
pomed to demonstrate that Gralise was “clinically superior” to
Neurontin and other PHN drugs.142 A drug is considered clinically su-
perior when it is shown to provide a significant therapeutic advantage
over the existing drugs that treat the same disease or condition.143 Pe-
titioners can demonstrate their drug’s clinical superiority by showing
its greater effectiveness, greater safety (including the reduction in ad-
verse side effects), or by some other “major contribution to patient
care.”144 The FDA reasoned that the seven-year period of marketing
exclusivity was unwarranted without a showing of Gralise’s clinical su-
periority because:
No rationale [supports awarding] taxpayer monies [to the] clinical
development of an identical product for an identical indication as
one which has been approved after the most thorough evaluation
possible. [And this] point remains valid even when the rare disease
product initially approved to market was never designated as an Or-
phan product.145
Accordingly, the FDA denied multiple petitions to designate Gralise
as an orphan drug when Depomed failed to demonstrate that the drug
was clinically superior to the existing PHN treatments.146 The FDA
140. Id. at 224.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 226 (noting that a showing of clinical superiority is required prior to
seven-year exclusivity period).
143. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3)(i)–(iii) (2018).
144. Id.
145. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 224.
146. See id. at 225 (noting that the stated reason for the denial was the lack of
evidence of clinical superiority) (internal quotation marks removed). After De-
pomed’s first petition was denied, Abbott Labs (“Abbott”) acquired the rights to
Gralise and submitted an application for marketing rights to the FDA. Id. The FDA
conditionally granted a renewed request for the designation of Gralise as an orphan
drug in 2010, pending Abbott’s ability to demonstrate the drug was “clinically supe-
rior.” Id. at 225–26. In that time, the FDA renewed the petition with an argument for
how it was clinically superior to Neurontin and other generic drugs already treating
PHN. Id. Consequently, the FDA designated Gralise for treatment of an orphan dis-
ease in January of 2011 but denied the seven-year period of exclusivity because Ab-
bott had not proven that Gralise was clinically superior to Neurontin. Id. at 226.
Depomed reacquired the rights to Gralise and sued the FDA under the APA for
refusing to recognize exclusivity that was required by a plain reading of the statute.
Id. Gralise ultimately submitted documents asserting why Gralise was clinically supe-
rior to Neurontin, but these were rejected by the FDA. See id.
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ultimately designated Gralise as an orphan drug but refused to extend
the seven-year period of marketing exclusivity.147
The FDA’s refusal to extend financial benefits to Gralise further
demonstrates the FDA’s interpretation of the purpose of the Statute:
ODA benefits are only useful when they improve patient care.148
Therefore, the FDA’s refusal to grant Gralise’s market exclusivity ad-
ditionally serves to highlight the discord between the Statute’s intent
and purpose. The FDA’s extra requirement of clinical superiority fur-
thers the purpose of the Statute. With this higher standard of clinical
superiority, the FDA can limit the ODA financial benefits to makers
of drugs that would otherwise not be able to recuperate their develop-
ment costs or whose drugs will dramatically improve patient care.149
Therefore, drugs like Gralise would not merit the extension of the
seven-year period of exclusivity because the FDA does not recognize
a need for additional drugs to treat orphan diseases already treatable
by existing drugs in the market.150 Depomed argued that the FDA
abused its discretion in violation of the APA when it constructed this
extra-statutory requirement of uniqueness, or special clinical
superiority.151
The Depomed Court did not consider the validity of the FDA’s de-
termination of what makes a drug clinically superior.152 However, it
did consider whether this FDA-promulgated153 requirement of uni-
queness strayed from the discretion Congress afforded to the FDA
under the ODA.154 Ultimately, the Depomed Court determined that
the FDA’s administration of ODA benefits did not comply with a
plain reading of the Statute.155 Depomed first contested the FDA’s
denial of the seven-year period of exclusivity by asserting that the
FDA owed Gralise its exclusivity period because existing drug treat-
ments for PHN never received orphan drug approval.156 To this, the
FDA responded that the only relevant factor in denying Gralise was
that it had not made a showing of “clinically superiority.”157 Accord-
ingly, whether the existing treatments held designations as orphan
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 221.
150. Id. at 224.
151. Id. at 220.
152. Id. at 229 (“[T]the Court finds no need to proceed beyond Chevron’s step one,
meaning that the Court’s analysis need not, and does not, address Depomed’s argu-
ment that the FDA’s interpretation of the Act to permit regulations that require
clinical superiority was unreasonable.”).
153. The FDA promulgated regulations known as the “Final Rule” in 2013 that
largely clarified the meaning behind clinical superiority. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3)
(2018).
154. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 237.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 224.
157. Id. at 225.
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drugs was not dispositive in determining Gralise’s orphan drug ap-
proval.158 Thus, even though Gralise had received designation and ap-
proval as an orphan drug, the FDA argued that denying Gralise a
period of exclusivity was within its discretion because it was not “clini-
cally superior” to Neurontin.159
In response, Depomed asserted that the FDA had no discretion to
withhold a period of exclusivity once a drug earned designation as an
orphan drug.160 It was on this argument that Depomed ultimately pre-
vailed against the FDA and Gralise earned its exclusivity period.161
The court granted Depomed’s motion for summary judgment, finding
that “the plain language of the [ODA] unambiguously requires the
FDA to recognize that any drug that has been both designated as an
orphan drug . . . and also approved for marketing is entitled to an
exclusivity period.”162
To determine whether the FDA owed Depomed an exclusivity pe-
riod for Gralise, the Depomed Court closely examined the statutory
language of the ODA.163 The court found that the plain language of
the Statute was unambiguous, and a Chevron II analysis was unneces-
sary.164 Therefore, the court held that the ODA’s exclusivity provision
“does not permit or invite any discretion on the part of the FDA re-
garding whether or not to continue authorizing new such drug market-
ing once an orphan drug has been so designated and approved.”165
Finding the language of the Statute to be unambiguous, the District of
D.C. interpreted a narrow intent of the ODA: that Congress expressly
sought for all drugs that earn ODA approval to receive every ODA
benefit.166 Accordingly, Depomed suggests that the FDA does not re-
tain discretion to determine the degree to which ODA incentives
158. See id.
159. Id. at 219–20.
160. Id. at 226.
161. See id. at 237.
162. Id. at 220.
163. Id. at 230.
164. Id. at 229 (“As explained further below, this Court concludes that the plain
language of the Orphan Drug Act requires the FDA to recognize exclusivity for Gral-
ise. Consequently, the Court finds no need to proceed beyond Chevron’s step one,
meaning that the Court’s analysis need not, and does not, address Depomed’s argu-
ment that the FDA’s interpretation of the Act to permit regulations that require
clinical superiority was unreasonable.”); see also Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Burwell, No.
GJH-15-852, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68230, at *37 (D. Md. May 27, 2015) (noting that
the ODA, specifically section 360cc, is unambiguous).
165. Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 231.
166. See id. at 230 (“the text . . . makes clear that the incentive Congress intended
to create in the orphan drug context is not a thing to be ‘conveyed’ to drug manufac-
turers at all; rather, it is a restriction of the FDA’s ability to approve the marketing of
other such drugs for the same rare disease or condition . . . when a drug that has been
designated as an orphan drug is approved for marketing.”).
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should be administered to any drug once designated as an orphan
drug.167
Expressing its frustration with the Depomed decision, the FDA al-
most immediately issued a public statement qualifying the holding and
affirming its commitment to the “clinical superiority” standard.168
Shortly thereafter, the FDA promulgated new regulations to distin-
guish the Depomed facts as unique in anticipation of future litiga-
tion.169 Through the regulations, the FDA sought to clarify that it
would not approve drugs that it determines to be the “same” and not
clinically superior to their pre-approved counterparts.170 Thus, the
FDA reaffirmed its commitment to the purpose of the ODA: that ex-
clusivity is owed only to those orphan-designated drugs worthy of
ODA financial support. In so doing, the FDA argued that the De-
pomed decision failed to effectuate the purpose of the ODA when it
granted Depomed its seven-year period of exclusivity.
In Baker Norton Pharms. v. FDA, the District of D.C.’s plain read-
ing of the Statute similarly furthered the ODA’s intent to the detri-
ment of its purpose.171 In evaluating the extent to which the ODA is
ambiguous in its use of the word “drug,” the court reasoned that the
“the Orphan Drug Act seeks to provide a meaningful financial incen-
tive for the development of orphan drugs.”172 However, as this Com-
ment articulates, the purpose of the ODA is broader than to simply
extend financial benefits to drug companies.173 The purpose is to en-
sure that patients gain access to novel pharmaceutical treatments for
orphan diseases.174 When the Baker Court discussed the ODA’s finan-
cial incentives,175 it described what Depomed called the “unambigu-
167. Id.
168. Policy on Orphan Drug Exclusivity; Clarification, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,888, (Dec.
23 2014) (“In consideration of any uncertainty created by the court’s decision in De-
pomed, the Agency is issuing this statement. It is the Agency’s position that, given the
limited terms of the court’s decision to GRALISE, FDA intends to continue to apply
its existing regulations in part 316 to orphan-drug exclusivity matters. FDA interprets
section 527 of the FD&C Act and its regulations (both the older regulations that still
apply to original requests for designation made on or before August 12, 2013, as well
as the current regulations) to require the sponsor of a designated drug that is the
‘same’ as a previously approved drug to demonstrate that its drug is ‘clinically supe-
rior’ to that drug upon approval in order for the subsequently approved drug to be
eligible for orphan-drug exclusivity.”).
169. See Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,117, 36,118 (June 12, 2013)
(amending 21 C.F.R. pt. 316).
170. Id.
171. Baker Norton Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 132 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35–36
(D.D.C. 2001).
172. Id. at 35.
173. See supra Part II.A.
174. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(1), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983).
175. Baker Norton Pharm., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 38.
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ous intent” of the Statute.176 In both cases, the District of D.C.’s strict
interpretation of the Statute effectuates the intent of the ODA.177
Thus, similar to the Depomed holding, the Baker holding misrepre-
sents the true purpose of the ODA.
In Depomed, the court did not engage in a Chevron II analysis or
grant the FDA Chevron deference because it interpreted the Statute
to expressly require that the FDA confer Gralise the full benefits of
the ODA.178 In Depomed, the FDA had to adhere to the court’s strict
interpretation of Congress’s intent because the FDA designated Gral-
ise as an orphan drug that could be marketed for that purpose.179
When the Depomed court found that Gralise earned designation as a
new orphan drug designed to treat a rare disease or condition, the
court held that the Statute required the FDA to extend marketing ex-
clusivity to Depomed for the marketing and development of Gral-
ise.180 Therefore, the FDA improperly denied Gralise marketing
exclusivity in the first place because it met the statutory qualifications
of earning designation of and approval for marketing as an orphan
drug.181 The FDA did not immediately approve Gralise because other
drugs were on the market to treat PHN.182 While the FDA ultimately
determined that Gralise was clinically superior, the FDA’s refusal to
extend marketing exclusivity thereafter suggests it does not believe
Gralise’s clinical superiority deserved full ODA protections.183
Depomed clarifies the FDA’s position that the award of marketing
exclusivity is only owed to companies that devote resources and capi-
tal into the development of new orphan drugs.184 This notion seems
consistent with the express purpose of the Statute: to create lucrative
incentives that can help companies recuperate the costs of developing
otherwise unprofitable orphan drugs.185 But, implied in that grant of
incentives is that the drug would otherwise not be profitable.186 That
is, absent the ODA’s financial protections, the drug would not exist.187
176. Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d 217,
224 (D.D.C. 2014).
177. See id. at 229 (stating that “[a]n examination of any statute for indicia of ambi-
guity under Chevron must begin (and may end) with an analysis of the statutory
text.”); Baker Norton Pharm., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 34 (stating that “the Court starts
with the relevant statutory language of the Orphan Drug Act.”).
178. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 229.
179. Id. at 233.
180. Id. at 233–34 (noting that Gralise is used to treat PHN).
181. Id. at 230.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 226.
184. See id.
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Whether Gralise could have been profitable without the ODA pro-
tections is hard to determine.188 However, the FDA’s initial reluctance
to award marketing exclusivity to Gralise tends to illustrate the FDA’s
belief that the Statute did not justify awarding Gralise the ODA’s fi-
nancial incentives.189 However, because of the way that Congress orig-
inally drafted the ODA, if the FDA approves a drug for orphan
designation, the FDA will be required to extend all ODA benefits to
the drug, including market exclusivity.190 Extension of market exclu-
sivity is necessary even if the FDA finds that the drug is not in need of
ODA financial support.191 As the ODA was written, the FDA had to
grant the ODA’s financial incentives to any drug that demonstrated
clinical superiority.192 Thus, granting ODA benefits to all drugs that
earn designation tends to effectuate the intent of the ODA at the ex-
pense of its true purpose.
However, the Depomed holding arguably effectuates the purpose of
the ODA: that sponsors develop more orphan drug remedies.193 When
the Depomed court read the Statute to be unambiguous and required
the FDA to approve Gralise, the market gained another orphan
drug.194 Patients suffering from PHN gained access to the convenience
and flexibility of Gralise’s slow-release Gabapentin product.195 Con-
gress expressly intended this result: more orphan-drug remedies avail-
able on the market.196
Other courts have adjudicated claims regarding the ODA with simi-
lar results.197 In Berlex Lab v. FDA, the District of D.C. deferred to
the FDA’s interpretation of its regulations relating to the ODA’s fi-
nancial incentives.198 The court found that the FDA had an adequate
basis upon which to consider the petitioner’s drug, Avonex, clinically
superior to an existing drug, Betaseron, which treated the same or-
phan disease.199 To arrive at this conclusion, the FDA determined that
the substantial reduction in side effects of the newer petitioning drug,
Avonex, justified invalidating the older remedy’s market exclusiv-
ity.200 As the court noted:
188. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 219 (discussing FDA’s contention that exclu-
sivity was not necessary for Gralise to recuperate costs).
189. See id. at 224.
190. Id. at 230.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 222–23.
193. See id. at 237.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 224.
196. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(3)–(5), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983).
197. See Berlex Labs., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 942 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D.D.C.
1996).
198. Id. at 24.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 23.
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The statute does permit FDA approval of a drug that treats the
same condition as did the original orphan drug if FDA determines
that the two drugs are not the same. FDA’s implementing regula-
tions provide that a new drug will not be considered the same as a
previously approved drug if the new drug is “clinically superior.”201
Accordingly, the Berlex court held that the FDA did not arbitrarily
nullify Betaseron’s orphan drug exclusivity after finding that Avonex
was different and clinically superior.202
However, while the Berlex and Depomed decisions brought new or-
phan drugs to consumers, this outcome alone does not fulfill the pur-
pose of the Statute.203 Like in Depomed, the Berlex court’s
construction of the ODA resulted in another orphan drug entering the
market.204 However, unlike in Depomed, the petitioning drug Avonex
was a substantial improvement over Betaseron relative to Gralise’s
purported superiority over Neurontin.205 Arguably, the District of
D.C. in Berlex served dual public interests.206 First, the public benefit-
ted from gaining access to another orphan drug remedy.207 Addition-
ally, the public benefitted in having the resources of the ODA
tactfully used to incentivize and develop Avonex, a substantially im-
proved medication.208
Depomed is further distinguishable from Berlex in that Neurontin
and the other generic drugs already treating PHN were not substan-
tially less effective than Gralise.209 Thus, after Gralise received market
exclusivity, the public benefited from having an additional drug on the
market, even though the FDA never believed that Gralise’s clinical
superiority warranted ODA benefits.210 The critical difference be-
tween the FDA’s clinical superiority determinations in Depomed and
Berlex is that in Berlex the FDA argued that the degree of Avonex’s
superiority over Betaseron warranted extension of ODA benefits.211
Contrarily, in Depomed, the FDA contended that Gralise never of-
fered a major contribution to patient care justifying market exclusiv-
201. See id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 316(b)(13)(ii) (2018)).
202. See id. at 22 (noting that the “FDA . . . [based] its conclusion on the substan-
tially less frequent occurrence of the death of skin tissue in the injection area, or
injection site necrosis, associated with Avonex” and that Avonex users benefit from
an 81% reduction in injection site reactions as compared to Betaseron).
203. See Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d
217, 237 (D.D.C. 2014); Berlex Labs., 942 F. Supp. at 27.
204. See Berlex Labs., 942 F. Supp. at 27.
205. See id. at 24.
206. See id. at 27.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 24.
209. See Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d
217, 224 (D.D.C. 2014).
210. See Part III.A (discussing the social purpose of the ODA); see also Orphan
Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(5)–(6), 96 Stat. 2049, 2049 (1983).
211. See Berlex Labs., 942 F. Supp. at 24.
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ity.212 In both cases, the market gained a new orphan drug remedy.213
However, in Depomed, the FDA determined that ODA benefits were
unnecessary and unwarranted because Gralise was not clinically supe-
rior to the same degree as Avonex over Betaseron.214 Thus, it seems
that unless a drug furthers the social purpose of the ODA by demon-
strating substantial clinical superiority over other drugs already treat-
ing the same rare disease or condition, the FDA intends to withhold
marketing exclusivity.
The FDA’s view of the ODA’s purpose is consistent with how many
critics of the ODA see the Statute’s primary goals.215 Critics of the
ODA are not concerned with whether orphan drugs make it to mar-
ket.216 Rather, the issue is whether the orphan drugs that are ulti-
mately brought to market are prohibitively expensive for consumers
and insurance companies.217 Getting the drugs on the market is insuf-
ficient to fulfill the Statute’s purpose if they are too expensive for pa-
tients to use.218 Thus, the presence of orphan drugs in the market
alone will not satisfy the ODA’s goals when the new drug expends
valuable ODA resources on development that may have never re-
quired the financial support. The FDA itself asserted that Gralise did
not deserve any orphan drug protections.219 Consequently, extending
marketing exclusivity to Gralise resulted in the misuse of taxpayer
resources.220
Depomed illustrates a unique situation where an orphan drug that
gains approval from the FDA likely does not further the goals of the
Statute. The Depomed litigation highlights that the intent and the pur-
pose of the ODA are in conflict.221 Because the District of D.C. inter-
preted the ODA to be unambiguous, the Chevron doctrine rendered
the FDA unable to use its own discretion in administering ODA bene-
fits without additional congressional authorization.222 Fortunately,
Congress amended the ODA in 2017, so the FDA can keep drugs like
Gralise from frustrating the purpose of the ODA.223 Though, Con-
gress failed to fully address the tension between the Statute’s intent
and purpose with its amendment in 2017.
212. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 224.
213. Id. at 237; Berlex Labs., 942 F. Supp. 3d at 27.
214. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 224.




219. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 224.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
223. See infra Part IV.
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IV. FDA-PROMULGATED REGULATIONS WILL SPARK LITIGATION,
NOT RELIEVE THE ODA’S CONFLICTING INTENT
AND PURPOSE
On December 23, 2014, shortly after the District of D.C. decided
Depomed, the FDA published new regulations.224 Therein, the FDA
justified its stringent interpretation of what qualifies as a “same
drug.”225 The FDA sought to qualify the Depomed holding and pro-
vide an explanation for how it will determine a drug’s “sameness” in
future orphan drug petitions.226 Specifically, the FDA communicated
its “[intent] to continue to apply its existing regulations . . . to orphan-
drug exclusivity matters.”227 According to the FDA, a sponsor for a
drug that is determined to be the “same” as a previously approved
drug will need to demonstrate “clinical superiority” in order to be eli-
gible for orphan-drug exclusivity.228 The FDA maintained that a drug
is the “same” as another if it uses the same “active moiety” as another
existing drug.229 Purportedly, this rationale is not in conflict with
Depomed.230
However,  United Therapeutics Corporation (“UTC”) filed a law-
suit in the summer of 2017, suggesting that the FDA’s decision to
maintain this posture with respect to a drug’s sameness is errone-
ous.231 UTC filed a complaint on August 4, 2017, alleging that the
FDA “unlawfully denied granting the company a period of orphan
drug exclusivity . . . for Orenitram (treprostinil)” after the FDA desig-
nated it as an orphan drug in December 2013.232 Orenitram treats pul-
224. Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,117 (June 12, 2013).
225. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 316.3(b)(12), 316.31(a) (2018).
226. See Policy on Orphan-Drug Exclusivity; Clarification, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,888
(Dec. 23, 2014).
227. Id. at 76,888.
228. Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 35,117–18.
229. Otuska Pharm. Co v. Price 869 F.3d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“A drug’s active
moiety has long played a key role in determining its eligibility to receive marketing
exclusivity: to be entitled to exclusivity, a drug must either contain a previously unap-
proved active moiety or use an approved moiety in a new way. In approving [another
drug], the FDA staked out the position that a drug’s active moiety not only deter-
mines its eligibility for marketing exclusivity, but also defines the field of drugs sub-
ject to that exclusivity.”).
230. See Policy on Orphan-Drug Exclusivity; Clarification, 79 Fed. Reg. at 76,888
(“In consideration of any uncertainty created by the court’s decision in Depomed, the
Agency is issuing this statement. It is the Agency’s position that, given the limited
terms of the court’s decision to GRALISE, FDA intends to continue to apply its ex-
isting regulations in part 316 to orphan-drug exclusivity matters.”).
231. Kurt R. Karst, United Therapeutics Sues FDA After Agency Denies Orphan
Drug Exclusivity for ORENITRAM, FDA L. BLOG (Aug. 9, 2017), http://
www.fdalawblog.net/2017/08/united-therapeutics-sues-fda-after-agency-denies-or-
phan-drug-exclusivity-for-orenitram/ [https://perma.cc/ULY2-HV8G].
232. Id.; see also Press Release, United Therapeutics, United Therapeutics An-
nounces FREEDOM -EV Study of Orenitram® To Continue As Planned Following
Interim Analysis (Sept. 7, 2017, 8:00 PM ET), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-re-
leases/united-therapeutics-announces-freedom-ev-study-of-orenitram-to-continue-as-
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monary arterial hypertension (“PAH”), a disease that satisfies the
ODA’s definition of a rare disease.233 UTC’s complaint analogized to
claims in Depomed, asserting that the “FDA has given itself authority
found nowhere in the statute to withhold the statutory orphan drug
exclusivity Congress utilized to incentivize the development of these
drugs.”234 UTC argued that the FDA’s actions directly conflicted with
the express language of the ODA and the court’s holding in De-
pomed.235 This dispute highlights the tension between the ODA’s legal
intent and social purpose. Like the court in Depomed, UTC maintains
that the ODA strictly requires the FDA to provide seven years of mar-
ket exclusivity to any drug that has received designation as an orphan
drug, including Orenitram.236
When UTC petitioned the FDA to designate Orenitram as an or-
phan drug, UTC already owned two existing drugs that treat PAH:
Remodulin and Tyvaso.237 Patients take Remodulin intravenously,
and Tyvaso requires use of an inhalation device.238 Orenitram contains
the same active moiety as Remodulin and Tyvaso (treprostinil), but
Orenitram is administered orally once per day.239 Because all three
drugs contain the same “active moiety” to treat the same disease or
condition, the FDA considers them the “same” as defined by the Stat-
ute.240 Therefore, the FDA denied UTC’s petition to designate
Orenitam as an orphan drug because “UTC had not provided an ade-
quate hypothesis that . . . treprostinil is clinically superior . . . .”241
Like the drug Gralise in Depomed, Orenitram ultimately received
designation as an orphan drug, but the FDA withheld the accompany-
planned-following-interim-analysis-300516055.html [https://perma.cc/94W9-VRZF]
(“Orenitram is an extended-release, oral tablet form of treprostinil, which was
launched commercially in the United States during the second quarter of 2014. Oreni-
tram is the only FDA approved, orally administered prostacyclin analogue, and is the
only oral PAH prostacyclin class therapy approved in the United States that is titrat-
able to tolerability, without a dose ceiling. Orenitram was approved by the FDA in
December 2013 for treatment of PAH patients to improve exercise capacity.”).
233. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at 2–3, United Therapeutics
Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 1:117-cv-01577 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2017)
[hereinafter United Therapeutics Complaint].
234. Id. at 8.
235. Id. at 9 (“The FDA continues to act in direct conflict with both the [ODA] and
Judge Jackson’s holding in Depomed.”).
236. See Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d
217 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that once the two-prong statutory test has been met, the
FDA must provide marketing exclusivity to the petitioning pharmaceutical company).
237. See United Therapeutics Complaint, supra note 233, at 9.
238. Id. at 11.
239. Id. at 9–10.
240. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(2) (2018) (defining “active moiety” as “the molecule or
ion, excluding those appended portions of the molecule that cause the drug to be an
ester, salt (including a salt with hydrogen or coordination bonds), or other
noncovalent derivative (such as a complex, chelate, or clathrate) of the molecule, re-
sponsible for the physiological or pharmacological action of the drug substance.”).
241. United Therapeutics Complaint, supra note 233, at 11.
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ing period of market exclusivity.242 Similar to Depomed, UTC chal-
lenged the FDA’s decision to withhold the period of marketing
exclusivity after Orenitam earned designation as an orphan drug.243
According to UTC, the FDA rejected the contention that Oreni-
tram is clinically superior because UTC failed to “[demonstrate] . . .
by means of greater efficacy, greater safety or a major contribution to
patient care.”244 UTC challenged this exact requirement as violating
the APA for “[exceeding the FDA’s] statutory authority [and] other-
wise not in accordance with the law.”245 Currently, the UTC litigation
is stayed pending a ruling by the D.C. Circuit in Eagle Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. Azar, a case considering similar issues.246
A. The Modernization Plan Ignored the Discrepancy Between the
Intent and Purpose of the ODA
As previously discussed, the FDA published the Modernization
Plan in June 2017.247 The Plan describes how the FDA intended to
resolve the backlog of existing designation applications that poses
challenges for timely and accurate review of orphan drug designation
requests.248 The Plan promised that the FDA would have completely
reviewed older orphan drug designations by the end of September
2017.249 Additionally, the Plan committed the FDA to responding to
every new orphan drug designation request no later than ninety days
after receiving them.250 The ambitious set of changes includes mini-
mizing discretionary work, implementing a streamlined review tem-
plate, and improving collaboration with other offices that jointly
review the petitions.251
In September 2017, Scott Gottlieb, the commissioner of the FDA,
authored a press release that discussed the Plan and the FDA’s future
strategy for the ODA.252 The press release described how the FDA
completed the Plan ahead of schedule and noted various adjustments,
such as designing a new process to improve efficiency in the orphan
drug designation process.253 More importantly, however, Gottlieb ad-
dressed the designation process itself and explained how the FDA in-
242. Id. at 12. Unlike in Depomed, however, the FDA initially refused to recognize
Orenitram’s status as an orphan drug in 2011; it took until 2016 for the FDA to recog-
nize Orenitram’s orphan drug status. See id.
243. Id. at 13–14.
244. Id. at 12.
245. Id. at 13.
246. See Brief for the Federal Appellants, Eagle Pharma., Inc. v. Azar (No. 18-
5207).
247. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 9, at 1.




252. See Gottlieb, supra note 8.
253. Id.
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tended to reconsider the way it makes ODA incentives available.254
Specifically, Gottlieb noted that the FDA will “be taking new policy
steps to make sure that the incentives offered by the ODA are granted
by FDA in a way that’s consistent with the manner Congress in-
tended.”255 Gottlieb’s new focus for the FDA was to align the designa-
tion and review process more closely with the goals of the Statute.256
Gottlieb’s statement was timely, as UTC filed its lawsuit challenging
the FDA’s interpretation of the ODA one month prior.257 Gottlieb
publicly acknowledged that the FDA had been actively seeking to in-
terpret the goals of the ODA and “to get input on complex scientific
and regulatory issues such as those raised by molecularly targeted
drugs . . . and the appropriate application of orphan incentives in that
paradigm.”258 Such language strongly implies that the FDA intended
to determine the most appropriate way to administer the various fi-
nancial incentives of the ODA.259 This demonstrates a commitment to
the post-Depomed regulations: no drug will earn ODA market exclu-
sivity unless it demonstrates clinical superiority.260 And it further sug-
gests the gap between the FDA’s interpretation of the purpose of the
Statute and Congress’s intent will persist. As alleged by UTC and as
held by the District of D.C. in Depomed, Congress never granted the
FDA discretion to withhold ODA benefits.261
As discussed, Congress’s expressed intent in passing the ODA was
for the entire lucrative “basket of goodies” to be afforded to every
orphan drug for the treatment of a “rare disease or condition.”262 Got-
tlieb articulated that the FDA would continue to disagree with De-
pomed’s holding because it frustrated the purpose of the ODA.263 His
press release suggests that to preserve the purpose of the ODA, the
FDA must continue to wield discretion to determine which drugs de-
serve ODA exclusivity.264 The FDA’s intention to sort through its
backlog without giving merit to the Depomed holding will surely gen-
erate lawsuits and plaintiffs who, relying on the Depomed holding, will




257. See United Therapeutics Complaint, supra note 233, at 8.
258. See Gottlieb, supra note 8.
259. Id.
260. See supra Part III (discussing regulations promulgated after Depomed).
261. Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d 217,
219 (D.D.C. 2014).
262. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18 (“In a 2009 webinar, an FDA official
referred to the incentive package as ‘our basket of goodies.’”).
263. See Gottlieb, supra note 8 (FDA should examine “aspects of how the agency
grants designations, to make sure they continue to reflect . . . the goals intended by
Congress.”).
264. See id.
265. See Karst, supra note 231.
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1. The FDA’s Intentions with the Plan are Supported by the
Promulgation of the “Final Rule” in 2013
Before Depomed, the FDA finalized revisions to a proposed rule
from 2011 that sought to clarify section 316.3 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, the promulgated regulations defining general provisions
of the ODA.266 With the promulgation of the Final Rule, the FDA
sought to “clarify the existing regulation” and reaffirm that orphan
drug approval will only occur if no prior drug has been approved for
the same use.267 Moreover, the FDA clarified that sponsors “may have
to demonstrate clinical superiority to obtain orphan-drug designation
. . . and [that it] will recognize orphan-drug exclusivity as long as
clinical superiority to the previously approved drug is demon-
strated.”268 The FDA expressly communicated its rationale for these
requirements, noting that “these revisions will clarify, streamline, and
improve the orphan-drug designation process [and confirmed that
these] amendments are fully consistent with the Orphan Drug Act.”269
The FDA invited comments to the Final Rule and responded to each
in turn.270 Critics of the clinical superiority requirement commented
that “more liberal granting of orphan-drug designation[s] without
changing orphan-drug exclusivity requirements [furthers] the intent of
the Orphan Drug Act.”271 The FDA responded to such comments
simply by claiming that:
[T]he current framework is the best means for giving effect to the
intent of the Orphan Drug Act, to provide incentives for sponsors
to develop promising drugs for rare diseases and conditions that
would not otherwise be developed and approved, including drugs
that are potentially safer or more effective than already approved
drugs.272
To support this assertion, the FDA referenced a House Report from
1982 that noted that “the legislative history is replete with references
to the fundamental need to provide treatment for presently untreated
patients.”273 The FDA quoted this legislative history to emphasize that
the purpose of ODA resources is to support patients who have no
available treatments for their disease.274
266. See Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,117 (June 12, 2013) (amending
21 C.F.R. § 316).




271. Id. at 35,121.
272. See id. at 35,122 (emphasis added).
273. See id. (quoting Genentech Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 312 (D.D.C.
1987)).
274. Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 312 (D.D.C. 1987).
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With this background, the FDA’s recent Modernization Plan is es-
pecially relevant to the pending UTC litigation.275 Some critics may
argue that amending the ODA is unnecessary because the FDA’s
modernization plan will resolve the conflicts between the Statute’s in-
tent and purpose. Commentators suggest that the FDA welcomed
UTC’s challenge on Depomed grounds for an opportunity to go
before the District of D.C. once more.276 These commentators suggest
that the FDA sought a more favorable ruling recognizing the FDA’s
discretion to determine whether a drug is clinically superior before
providing ODA benefits.277 Despite the FDA’s willingness to engage
in litigation with UTC, the FDA’s stance is clear: the ODA’s benefits
should be reserved for drugs that advance the purpose of the ODA.278
The FDA will likely remain steadfast in the UTC litigation, maintain-
ing the position that the only drugs that effectuate the ODA’s purpose
are new drugs that improve health of patients suffering from orphan
diseases.279 The sponsors will only earn orphan drug designation by
demonstrating their drugs have a clinical superiority or make a “major
contribution to patient care” over the pre-approved counterparts.280
Nothing in the FDA’s promulgated rules, published commentary, or
litigation with Depomed suggests that the FDA believes that Congress
intended for ODA benefits to extend to new drugs that do not im-
prove patient care.281 However, the FDA’s Modernization Plan and its
commitment to this determination of which drugs deserve orphan
drug exclusivity could not resolve the underlying issue of the tension
between the intent and the purpose of the ODA. Even the Depomed
court suggests that the FDA should “[fashion] regulations to prevent
such abuse”282 in the designation of exclusivity phase to resolve the
Depomed problem. But, the Plan and the Final Rule suggest that the
FDA believes the only way it can effectuate the social purpose and
ultimate goal of the ODA is to deny marketing exclusivity to drugs
that do not help patients in a meaningful way.283 This is an insufficient
275. See Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,117 (June 12, 2013) (amending
21 C.F.R. § 316); see United Therapeutics Complaint, supra note 233, at 8.
276. Kurt R. Karst, How Effective is a “Depomed Threat” at Resolving an Orphan





278. See Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,117 (June 12, 2013) (amending
21 C.F.R. § 316).
279. See Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d
217, 221 (D.D.C. 2014); Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,117 (June 12,
2013) (amending 21 C.F.R. § 316).
280. See supra Part III.B (discussing the “clinical superiority”).
281. See supra Part III.B.
282. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 235.
283. Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,117 (June 12, 2013) (amending 21
C.F.R. § 316).
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solution because courts will continue to engage in Chevron analyses to
determine if the language of the ODA is ambiguous.
When courts hold the language of the ODA to be unambiguous,
like in Depomed, they find that the FDA lacks the discretion to deny
drugs market exclusivity once they receive orphan drug designation.
The Depomed decision highlights a sort of stalemate where companies
whose drugs meet the two-prong requirement284 and are qualified as
an orphan drug will continue to petition the FDA for exclusivity. But,
absent a showing of clinical superiority, the FDA will continue to deny
these drugs market exclusivity. Therefore, the Modernization Plan
alone could not resolve the most pressing issue involving the ODA:
handling situations where drugs met the intended statutory require-
ments of earning orphan-drug approval but failed to advance the pur-
pose of the ODA.
V. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE STATUTE AND PROVIDE THE
FDA MORE DISCRETION IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ODA BENEFITS
Central to the Depomed,285 United Therapeutics,286 and Berlex cases
is the challenge to the FDA’s interpretation of the ODA under the
APA.287 In each case, the sponsors questioned the legitimacy of the
FDA’s administration of the ODA.288 This Comment argues that the
tension between the intent and the purpose of the Statute explains why
the FDA denies drug petitions that do not demonstrate clinical superi-
ority.289 To resolve this tension, Congress had to amend the Statute to
empower the FDA with more discretion to administer ODA benefits.
Until Congress expressly provided the FDA with such discretion, law-
suits like Depomed and United Therapeutics were to continue.290
Depomed prevailed against the FDA because the Statute did not
expressly outline a method for the FDA to evaluate the degree to
which a sponsor’s drug deserves ODA benefits.291 As Depomed made
clear, the FDA must award a sponsor’s drug ODA benefits if it earns
approval and designation for treatment of a rare disease or condi-
tion.292 This is a problem when the drug that receives these ODA ben-
284. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (noting that once a drug has received
designation as an orphan drug and earned marketing approval for such a purpose, the
FDA must reward it with seven years of marketing exclusivity).
285. Id.
286. United Therapeutics Complaint, supra note 233, at 12–13.
287. Berlex Labs., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 942 F. Supp. 19, 26 (D.D.C. 1996).
288. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 228; Berlex Labs., 942 F. Supp. at 26; United
Therapeutics Complaint, supra note 233, at 12–13.
289. See supra Part III (discussing the difference between the intent and purpose of
the statute).
290. See supra Part IV (discussing the likely outcome of the UTC litigation).
291. See, e.g., Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 229–30 (noting that the FDA exceeded
its authority granted by the ODA).
292. Id.
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efits, like Gralise in Depomed, does not further the purpose of the
Statute. As discussed, the FDA’s reluctance to approve Gralise dem-
onstrates its belief that its addition to the market would not further
the purpose of the ODA.293 The FDA recognizes that some drugs can
satisfy the strict qualifications of becoming an orphan drug but may
not be deserving or in need of the ODA’s financial protections.294 To
avoid situations like Depomed and United Therapeutics, Congress had
to explicitly grant the FDA greater discretion in how it administers
ODA benefits to reconcile the divergent intent and purpose of the
Statute.295
Congress has effectively already determined that any drug that
treats fewer than 200,000 patients is unlikely to recuperate the costs of
production and is therefore deserving of ODA benefits.296 The ODA
also permits a sponsor to demonstrate that recuperating the costs of
development through sales alone is not possible even if the disease
affects more than 200,000 people.297 However, at the time of the De-
pomed and United Therapeutics litigation, no equivalent process ex-
isted for the FDA to assess and determine whether a drug that
qualifies for ODA benefits does not require financial incentives to
make it to market.298
The affordability of the drugs when they arrive on the market is
important because, as Kaiser Health News alleges, many orphan-drug
remedies are prohibitively expensive for patients.299 The ODA fails to
achieve its purpose when drugs that do not require financial support
make it to market and are prohibitively expensive.
293. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment & Cross-Motion at 2, United Therapeutics Corp. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:17-cv-01577 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2017)
(“Consistent with the statute’s purpose, FDA has, for more than twenty-five years,
interpreted the Orphan Drug Act to confer a seven-year period of exclusivity to only
the first drug approved as an orphan drug (meaning a drug with a new active ingredi-
ent or that is clinically superior). This interpretation is both reasonable and deserving
of deference. Indeed, Congress recently affirmed this interpretation in enacting the
FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017. Under this interpretation, UTC is not entitled to
continue its monopoly, because Orenitram is neither novel nor clinically superior to
the previously-approved versions of treprostinil. Orenitram should be denied exclu-
sivity, as FDA correctly decided. An alternative result would be anathema to the Or-
phan Drug Act’s underlying purpose, and would create a windfall for UTC to the
detriment of patients with a rare disease.”).
294. See supra Part III.A.
295. See, e.g., Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 230 (noting that the FDA exceeded its
authority granted by the ODA).
296. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012) (defining a “rare disease or condition” as
one “affect[ing] less than 200,000 persons in the United States”); see Gottlieb, supra
note 8 (“[A] rare disease [is] defined as a disease which generally affects fewer than
200,000 people in the United States . . . .”).
297. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2).
298. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 229–30.
299. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18.
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For example, imagine a situation where a brand new drug, “Drug
A,” earns ODA designation and is granted ODA exclusivity and bene-
fits for the treatment of rare disease, “Disease X.” At the time of its
approval, Drug A is unique and a completely new remedy to Disease
X that has thus far never had a pharmaceutical treatment. At this
point, the intent of the ODA has undoubtedly been achieved: a novel
remedy made it to market and was developed because of the ODA’s
financial benefits. Then, in the third year of its seven-year period of
exclusivity, Drug A breaks even and the pharmaceutical sponsor recu-
perates its costs of developing and producing the drug. Thereafter,
each new unit of sale earns the pharmaceutical company a profit.
If “Drug B” also treats Disease X and seeks FDA designation as an
orphan drug, the FDA would deny the drug designation for the re-
maining four years of Drug A’s exclusivity period under the ODA
unless Drug B demonstrates clinical superiority.300 This situation
matches the Depomed and Berlex cases.301 In situations where Drug A
has become profitable after recuperating its costs of production,
thwarting Drug B’s entrance into the market frustrates the purpose of
the ODA. This frustrates the purpose of the ODA because the intro-
duction of competitor Drug B could only drive-down prices of Drug A
and provide alternative treatments for patients suffering from Disease
X. The reduction in price and the increase in alternative treatments
are both of substantial benefit to patients suffering from orphan dis-
eases.302 Such outcomes would be consistent with the purpose of the
ODA. However, the ODA does not permit the FDA to examine the
extent of a sponsor’s financial need after it receives approval as an
orphan drug and received ODA benefits.303 In situations where Drug
A recuperates its costs, Congress should empower the FDA to reduce
Drug A’s exclusivity period only if it is shown that the prices of Drug
A are so prohibitive that the drug is not reasonably available to pa-
tients with Disease X.
A. Congress Must Permit the FDA to Consider Market Factors to
Selectively Administer ODA Benefits
In 2017, Congress passed the FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017
(“FDARA”).304 FDARA clarified that when the FDA determines a
petitioner seeks a new period of exclusivity for a drug that has previ-
ously enjoyed ODA benefits, the FDA should deny the same drug a
new period of exclusivity.305 Essentially, FDARA resolved the De-
300. See, e.g., Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 222; Berlex Labs., Inc. v. Food & Drug
Admin., 942 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D.D.C. 1996).
301. Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 226; Berlex Labs., 942 F. Supp. at 22.
302. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18.
303. See Depomed, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 229–30.
304. FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-52, 131 Stat. 1005 (2017).
305. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc (2012 & Supp. 2018).
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pomed situation and suggests that Congress ultimately agreed with the
FDA’s interpretation of the ODA.306 FDARA grants the FDA some
additional discretion in determining whether a drug deserves a period
of exclusivity.307
Though FDARA resolves some ambiguity in the ODA,308 Congress
should further expand the FDA’s ability to parse the benefits of the
ODA. Currently, no provision of the ODA contemplates the price at
which orphan drugs should be made available.309 Ideally, orphan
drugs would be affordable after the ODA subsidies supported their
development. However, Congress’s focus in 1983 was developing new
remedies, not the prices of the drugs themselves.310 Fortunately,
policymakers have begun revisiting the effectiveness of the ODA.311
As recently as February 2019, Senator Chuck Grassley and the Senate
Finance Committee called for a closer look at exorbitant drug prices
in the United States.312 The Senate Finance Committee panel ques-
tioned CEOs from big-name companies like Pfizer, Johnson & John-
son, and Merck about the increasingly high costs of drug prices.313
Congress has also sought drug pricing documents from twelve compa-
nies about various prescription drugs, more than half of which are or-
phan drugs with periods of market exclusivity.314 The congressional
scrutiny will draw due attention to the remaining issues with the
306. See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Cross-Motion at 26, United Therapeutics Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., (No. 1:17-cv-01577) (“Simply put, the FDARA clarifies what should have al-
ways been evident: the old version of the Orphan Drug Act was ambiguous, and FDA
properly interpreted that ambiguity to preclude the kind of automatic serial exclusiv-
ity that UTC seeks to achieve in this case.”).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 19.
309. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(5)–(6), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983).
310. Id.
311. See Sarah Jane Tribble, FDA Moves to Rein in Drugmakers’ Abuse of Orphan
Drug Law, NPR (Sept. 13, 2017, 1:20 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2017/09/13/550700062/fda-moves-to-rein-in-drugmakers-abuse-of-orphan-drug-
law [https://perma.cc/EQ3W-FTWP] (noting that “Gottlieb became commissioner in
May, a few months after three key Republican senators called for a federal investiga-
tion into potential abuses of the Orphan Drug Act. In March, the Government Ac-
countability Office agreed to investigate”).
312. See Sarah Karlin-Smith, ‘It’s Finally Pharma’s Turn’: Drug CEOs face Capitol
Hill reckoning, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2019, 10:11 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2019/02/25/drug-prices-hearing-congress-1182283 [https://perma.cc/N8DQ-ETPE].
313. Id.
314. Press Release, Elijah Cummings, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight
and Reform, House of Representatives, Oversight Committee Launches Sweeping
Drug Price Investigation (Jan. 14, 2019), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats
.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/_Drug%20Price%20Investigation%20Letters
%20Recipients.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y7F-DGFM] (follow “Click here for a list of
companies and drugs that are the subject of today’s letters” hyperlink) [https://
perma.cc/T9C8-8FVH]; see also Search Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals,
U.S FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/
index.cfm [https://perma.cc/29EA-BVSL] (by typing the name of the drug in to the
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ODA, and could precipitate additional amendments. By authorizing
the FDA to selectively administer the benefits of the ODA, Congress
can ameliorate policy concerns like the price of orphan drugs, outlined
by Senator Grassley, KHN, and other ODA critics.315
Congress must grant the FDA greater discretion to go “behind the
petition” and request that the sponsor provide a more comprehensive
showing of why a drug still requires ODA protections after recuper-
ating its costs. This additional amendment will better align the intent
and purpose of the ODA because Congress expressly designed the
Statute to facilitate the development of drugs that would otherwise
never be developed because of financial constraints.316 Thus, when an
orphan drug promises to be especially successful, or it recuperates its
costs of production and marketing before the seven-year period of ex-
clusivity, the FDA should be permitted to limit or alter the schedule of
benefits administered. Amending the Statute to permit the FDA this
extra discretion is consistent with the ODA’s legislative history.317
This amendment would ensure that ODA resources flow towards
more potential orphan drugs that genuinely need the financial support
or have yet to be developed. The challenge for Congress will be to
further amend the Statute such that the FDA cannot completely evis-
cerate the ODA’s strongest incentive: the seven-year period of market
exclusivity.318 Put differently, the FDA should only infringe on peri-
ods of exclusivity when market circumstances, including prohibitively
expensive drugs or the availability of clinically superior substitutes,
justifies ending market exclusivity.
Thus, returning to hypothetical Disease X, after Drug A recuper-
ates all of its costs, if the price of the drug is prohibitively expensive,
then Congress should authorize the FDA to reevaluate the original
drug’s need for exclusivity. Congress should permit the FDA to
shorten the period of exclusivity to facilitate the development of ge-
neric drugs to drive down prices. Doing so would resolve many of
KHN’s criticisms, including the prohibitive price issue.319 The FDA
could also link the amount of the award given for a new orphan-drug
petition to the degree to which it improves patient care.320 For exam-
ple, if Drug B only reduces side effects by a few percentage points or
changes the way the drug is administered, to avoid the Depomed or
search query, the website shows whether the drug is an orphan drug, whether it has
been approved for a period of market exclusivity, and how much time it has left)
315. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18.
316. See Orphan Drug Act § 1(b)(1)(6), 96 Stat. at 2049.
317. See Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 312 (D.D.C. 1987) (suggesting
that Congress’s priority in designing the ODA was to make novel orphan-drugs avail-
able for the first time).
318. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc (2012) (discussing the purpose of the ODA financial
incentives).
319. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 18.
320. Cf. Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d 217
(D.D.C. 2014) (discussing patient care as a factor in clinical superiority).
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Berlex situations, the FDA could grant the new drug some ODA bene-
fits to recuperate some of the costs of development. Because the mar-
ket benefits from competition that reduces prices, unless there is a
genuine need for the full seven years of exclusivity,321 the FDA should
be permitted to withhold this benefit on a case-by-case or piecemeal
basis.
1. Amending the Statute Will Resolve Many of Public Policy
Concerns Cited by KHN
Congress designed the tax incentives and periods of marketing ex-
clusivity to be financially lucrative.322 However, Congress should fur-
ther amend the Statute because the very exclusivity that breathes life
into orphan drugs might also be making the drugs prohibitively
expensive and not reasonably available.323 Here, “reasonably availa-
ble” means more than simply present in the market. Products are only
reasonably available when their intended consumers can afford them.
The KHN reports focus critically on the high prices of orphan-desig-
nated drugs324 because the purpose of the ODA cannot be achieved if
the drugs that rely on ODA benefits are too expensive for patients to
use. Therefore, the FDA can only effectuate the purpose of the ODA
if drugs that otherwise could not have made it to the market will be
reasonably available to consumers.
When companies earn marketing exclusivity, they enjoy effective
monopolies over their corner of the drug market, demanding any
price they choose without meaningful competition.325 Congress inten-
tionally designed the ODA with such enticing monopoly power to en-
courage the development of these high-cost drugs.326 Eliminating this
strong incentive would threaten the intent of the Statute; however, ex-
panding the FDA’s discretion would permit the FDA to introduce
competitor orphan drugs when prices of existing drugs are prohibi-
tively high.327 The amended Statute should continue to incentivize
sponsors who seek to provide novel remedies for orphan diseases that
have yet to market a pharmaceutical treatment.328 This Comment en-
dorses the FDA’s assessment that ODA resources should be priori-
tized to address untreated orphan disease populations.329 Thus, if
321. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entery, and Price
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331 (1992).
322. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(5)–(6), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983) (discussing the purpose of the ODA financial incentives).




327. See supra Part II.B.
328. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(5)-(6), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983).
329. See Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 312 (D.D.C. 1987).
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wielded appropriately, the FDA can use this new discretion to recon-
cile the intent and purpose of the Statute.330
2. Amending the Statute can Drive-Down Prices and Address
Salami-Slicing
Many ODA critics are frustrated with a practice called “salami-slic-
ing.”331 Salami-slicing occurs when pharmaceutical companies repur-
pose existing drugs that treat mainstream diseases to treat rare
diseases and conditions.332 FDARA resolves some serial exclusivity
issues but does not specifically address salami-slicing.333 Salami-slicing
also occurs when sponsors earn approval of a drug in multiple sub-
types of a disease.334 Humira provides a classic example of salami-
slicing and is one of the twelve drugs that was reviewed by the Senate
Finance Committee in February 2019.335 In 2002, the FDA initially
approved Humira to treat rheumatoid arthritis, a disease affecting
around 1.5 million people in the United States.336 Later, in 2008, the
FDA approved Humira to treat pediatric rheumatoid arthritis, an or-
phan disease.337 When Humira obtained its orphan designation,
Humira had already become the top-selling drug in the world, not in
need of the ODA financial protections.338
When a sponsor engages in salami-slicing, it takes advantage of the
fact that one type of orphan disease will often develop into multiple
varying subtypes over time, allowing for an indefinite monopoly over
330. Id.
331. See Michael Mezher, FDA Analyst Counters Critiques of ODA, REGULATORY




333. See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Cross-Motion at 26, United Therapeutics Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. (No. 1:17-cv-01577) (“Simply put, the FDARA clarifies what should have al-
ways been evident: the old version of the Orphan Drug Act was ambiguous, and FDA
properly interpreted that ambiguity to preclude the kind of automatic serial exclusiv-
ity that UTC seeks to achieve in this case.”).
334. Mezher, supra note 331.
335. See Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugs For Rare Diseases Have Be-
come Uncommonly Rich Monopolies, NPR (Jan. 17, 2017, 4:49 AM ET) https://
www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/01/17/509506836/drugs-for-rare-diseases-
have-become-uncommonly-rich-monopolies [https://perma.cc/S5MU-TCJ6]; see also
Press Release, Cummings, supra note 314.
336. See What is Rheumatoid Arthritis?, ARTHRITIS FOUND., http://
www.arthritis.org/about-arthritis/types/rheumatoid-arthritis/what-is-rheumatoid-ar-
thritis.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2019) [https://perma.cc/MVL8-JQNF]; see also Tribble
& Lupkin, supra note 335.
337. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 335.
338. Id.
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treating a disease.339 FDA analysts reject the premise that salami-slic-
ing alone is responsible for high orphan-drug prices.340 However,
when the same drug sponsor accrues multiple consecutive seven-year
exclusivity periods on the same drug, there is no competition to drive
down the drug’s price.341 Critics suggest that by permitting salami-slic-
ing, the ODA thwarts innovation and the creation of novel treatments
while protecting older orphan drug remedies.342
Because Congress’s priority in passing the ODA has always been to
incentivize development of drugs for diseases with no existing phar-
maceutical treatment, salami-slicing does not further the purpose of
the ODA.343 For example, Humira did not need ODA exclusivity to
be re-marketed for juvenile rheumatoid arthritis because Humira had
already become the top-selling drug in the world.344 Humira’s sponsor
could have afforded to market Humira to the juvenile patient popula-
tion without ODA status.345 Thus, the recent spike in ODA petitions
suggests that sponsors are pursuing orphan-drug designation because
of the substantial financial reward in obtaining the designation.346 Al-
though the Statute incentivizes sponsors to pursue the financial bene-
fits of the ODA, so long as salami-slicing is permissible, the ODA’s
purpose remains unachieved because ODA resources do not flow to
novel remedies.347
To resolve the salami-slicing issue, the FDA could implement slid-
ing scales that reward varying degrees of financial support for a spon-
sor’s drug. In the amended Statute, Congress could permit the FDA to
award a degree of ODA benefits linked to the market need and the
339. Ryan Marling, Salami-Slicing, Precision Medicine, and the Orphan Drug Act,
CHRISTIANSEN INST. (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.christenseninstitute.org/blog/salami-
slicing-precision-medicine-orphan-drug-act/ [https://perma.cc/X4PH-UCWN].
340. See Mezher, supra note 331.
341. See Marling, supra note 339.
342. Id.
343. See Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 312 (D.D.C. 1987).
344. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 335.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See id. (“More than 80 other orphans won FDA approval for more than one
rare disease, and in some cases, multiple rare diseases. For each additional approval,
the drugmaker qualified for a fresh batch of incentives. Botox, stocked in most der-
matologists’ offices, started out as a drug to treat painful muscle spasms of the eye
and now has three orphan drug approvals. It’s also approved as a mass market drug to
treat a variety of ailments, including chronic migraines and wrinkles. Altogether,
KHN’s investigation found that about a third of orphan approvals by the FDA since
the program began have been either for repurposed mass market drugs or drugs that
received multiple orphan approvals.”). See also Baker Norton Pharm., Inc. v. Food &
Drug Admin., 132 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Because the drug is designated
as an orphan drug before it is approved, more than one applicant may receive orphan
designation for what later may be deemed the same ‘drug’ for treatment of the same
disease or condition. Once the drug is designated an orphan drug, it goes through the
approval process for orphan drug exclusivity under 21 U.S.C. § 360cc.”).
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likelihood of recuperating costs.348 As discussed, the FDA already re-
quires a sponsor to demonstrate that there is no reasonable expecta-
tion that the cost of developing and making the drug will be recovered
in the United States.349 The amended Statute should allow the FDA to
reevaluate a sponsor’s financial need after the drug has entered the
market. This amendment would motivate sponsors to continue to in-
novate and improve their orphan drug, ultimately improving competi-
tion and driving down prices. With lower prices, the availability of
orphan drugs increases, advancing the original purpose of the Statute.
Because the sole intention of the exclusivity period is to help com-
panies recuperate production costs and incentivize development, once
that has occurred, the financial benefit of exclusivity becomes more of
a privilege than a need.350 Undoubtedly, periods of exclusivity should
be extended to sponsors when circumstances warrant: like when pro-
hibitive development costs would otherwise stymie the development
of a treatment for an orphan disease. Furthermore, when an orphan
drug is reasonably available to patients and there are no alternative
treatments promising any major contribution to patient care, the ini-
tial sponsor should maintain its full seven-year period of exclusivity.351
The FDA should only reduce the original sponsor’s seven-year exclu-
sivity period when more promising treatment alternatives emerge that
also require ODA financial incentives to offset prohibitive develop-
ment costs.352 The FDA could reduce the exclusivity period of an ex-
isting drug when the target patient population would be substantially
improved, either through cheaper alternative orphan drugs or safer,
more effective orphan drugs.353
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress did not intend for the ODA to be a pathway for pharma-
ceutical companies to improve their profitability.354 Rather, the goal
of the ODA is clear: to remove financial barriers to the development
of treatments for rare diseases and conditions so that patients can get
access to pharmaceutical remedies for the first time.355 Thus, when a
sponsor recuperates the orphan drug’s costs of production and makes
348. This ensures consistency with the original purpose and intent of the ODA.
349. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 335.
350. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(5)–(6), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983).
351. See id. (supporting the assertion that the intent of the Statute is to incentivize
the development of orphan drugs with seven-year periods of market exclusivity).
352. See Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d
217, 234 (D.D.C. 2014); Berlex Labs., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 942 F. Supp. 19, 23
(D.D.C. 1996).
353. Berlex Labs., 942 F. Supp. at 23.
354. Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(5)–(6), 96 Stat. 2049,
2049 (1983); see also Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 335.
355. See Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 312 (D.D.C. 1987).
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it to market, or even becomes profitable, the intent of the ODA has
been satisfied.356 The purpose might still remain unfulfilled, however,
if the drugs are so prohibitively expensive that patients cannot
purchase or use them.357
To effectuate the purpose of the ODA, Congress must permit the
FDA to forecast a drug’s financial success and exercise greater discre-
tion over the administration of ODA benefits.358 In so doing, Con-
gress can remedy the issue of salami-slicing and the prohibitively high
prices of some orphan drugs. The challenge for Congress will be to
resolve the salami-slicing problem without destroying the ODA’s
strongest incentive: seven years of market exclusivity. However, the
FDA routinely exercises discretion in construing definitions of what
makes a drug the “same” or how it demonstrates a major contribution
to patient care, so this additional authority is not without precedent.359
With such authority, the FDA can reconcile the intent and purpose of
the ODA to ensure patients suffering from orphan diseases have ac-
cess to reasonably affordable orphan drugs.
356. See supra Part II.B.
357. See supra Part II.A.
358. See supra Part II.A.
359. See, e.g., Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp.
3d 217 (D.D.C. 2014); Berlex Labs., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 942 F. Supp. 19
(D.D.C. 1996).
